Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 51

Issue 1

Article 15

1962

Torts--Suit by Administrator of Deceased Infant's Estate Against
Parent for Wrongful Death
William L. Montague
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Montague, William L. (1962) "Torts--Suit by Administrator of Deceased Infant's Estate Against Parent for
Wrongful Death," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 51: Iss. 1, Article 15.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol51/iss1/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUY LAW jOuYNAL

[Vol. 51,

TORTS-SUiT BY ADMINISTRATOR OF DECEASED INFANT S ESTATE AGA=JsT
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH.-Admlmstrator of the deceased infant's
estate brought a wrongful death action against the infant's father to
recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by the father s negligence in an automobile accident. The trial court held for the
defendant; a wrongful death action in tort on behalf of an unemancipated infant cannot be maintained against Ins parent. Held: Reversed. The common law disability of a child to sue his parent in tort
does not apply to wrongful death actions by the administrator of the
mfant's estate. The Kentucky constitutional' and statutory2 provisions
concerning wrongful death create a new cause of action which cannot
be abridged or defeated by the common law rule. Harlan National
Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky 1961).
Tis decision overrules Harralson v. Thomas3 in which recovery
was denied on the grounds that the wrongful death statute merely
extended the cause of action the injured party would have had if he
survived, and since the child had no cause of action while living, it
could not have been perpetuated after death. The Gross decision
is a return to the view held by Kentucky prior to the Harralson case.
In Robinson Admr v. Robinson,4 the court held that a wrongful death
action could be maintained by a wife s administrator against her husband, who had murdered the wife. 5 The opinion stated that the right
of action was expressly provided by the constitution, and no common
law rule could possibly defeat such an explicit and mandatory
provision. 6 By readopting the Robinson view, the court in the Gross
decision has construed the wrongful death provisions of the constitution and statute as creating a new right of action in the heirs, which
is independent of the cause of action the decedent would or would
not have had, if he had lived.
The Harralson decision followed the majority view in the United
States.7 Numerous cases deny recovery by the decedent's administrator
PARE

I2 Ky.

Const. §241.

Ky. Rev. Stat. §411.180(1) (1962).

3 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
4 188 Ky. 49, 220 S.W 1074 (1920).

5 At common law neither husband nor wife could sue the other for personal
m]unes resulting from negligence; this, like the disability of a child to sue its
parent, is based on the preservation of family harmony and domestic tranquility.
Today the courts in a minority of the states, including Kentucky, hold that since
the enactment of the various married women s statutes, one spouse may sue the
other for tort. For a discussion of this see Note, 42 Ky. L.J. 497 (1954).
6 Ky. Const. §241 provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall result from an in ury inflicted
by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may
be recovered for such death, from the corporations and persons so
causing the same.
7
Prosser, Torts §105 (2d ed. 1958).
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because the decedent would have been barred by the common law
disability had he lived.8 Unlike Kentucky, however, the majority of
the states have wrongful death statutes which limit recovery by the
personal representative to situations where the decedent could have
recovered had he lived.9
Contrary to the general rule, "there is a strong minority view
based upon the theory that death destroys the reason for the
immunity.
"10 In Illinois, an action by a wife s administrator was
permitted against the husband's estate, where the husband had
murdered his wife and committed suicide.i- The court stated: "an
immunity based upon the preservation of marital harmony can have
no pertinence in this case, for here the marriage has been terminated,
husband and wife are both dead, and the action is brought for the
benefit of a third person." 2 This decision was handed down despite
a wrongful death statute which limited recovery to situations where
the injured party could maintain an action "if death had not ensued.
"i3 Another court,' 4 confronted with similar facts and statutory
provisions, 15 asserted: "we think it is unreasonable to imply that the
Legislature intended to bar the right of action created by the Act on
account of a disability to sue which is personal to a party having an
18,
entirely separate and distinct right of action
The personal disability of a child to sue his parent is based on the
protection of the family relationship.' 7 The policy consideration
underlying this disability is that to allow suits by children against
their parents would only encourage intra-family friction and disharmony The very relationship the disability is designed to protect,
however, is no longer in existence after the child's death. As the
Kentucky court pointed out in the principal case, the "potential evil
is removed by the death of the child." 8 The wrongful death statute
as construed in the principal case creates a new cause of action for
the benefit of the heirs. This cause of action, which is derived from
the tortious act, and not from the person of the deceased,19 "is allowed
upon the theory that the wrongful death of the ancestor works a
8
E.g., Strong v. Strong. 70 Nev. 290, 267 P.2d 240 (1954); Levlock v.
Spanos, 101 N.H. 22, 131 A.2d 319 (1957).
9 Prosser, Torts §105 (2d ed. 1953).

20 Ibid.

11 Welsh v. Davis, 410 Il. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951).

Id. at 132, 101 N.E.2d at 549.
13111. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, §1 (1961).
14 Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
15 Fla. Stat. Ann. §768.01 (1961).
16
17 Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 908 (Fla. 1955).
Prosser, Torts §101 (2d ed. 19535.
18 Harlan Natl Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 483 (Ky. 1961).
19 Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944).
12
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personal injury to his heirs, in that it deprives them of some pecuniary
or other benefit which they would have received except for the death
of the ancestor."20 The disability of the decedent to sue should
constitute no defense to this cause of action which is created by the
legislature to compensate the heirs for the injury they receive as a
21
result of the decedent's death.
Normally, who pays the damages in these cases? Is it not safe to
assume that insurance companies are involved? If there had been no
automobile liability insurance in the principal case the parties surely
would not have been interested in paying the attorney s fee for having
a portion of the husband's estate transferred to the wife within the
same family unit.z2 Does this mean that a tortfeasor may benefit
from his own wrong? Confronted with this problem, the Kentucky
court has held that the recovery will be reduced by the amount of
the defendant's distributive share of the damages. 23 In the principal
case, the court indicated adherence to this view by stating: "Although
the question is not before us, it may be noted that in the event of a
recovery the parent held liable cannot receive the benefits of such
recovery as a designated beneficiary under the statute."24 Theoretically,
the wrongdoer is not recovering; actually, he may indirectly benefit
as a member of the family unit.
The purpose of the wrongful death statute is to compensate the
heirs for the damage they sustain as a result of the decedent's death.
Even though the defendant may indirectly benefit from the recovery,
the other heirs should not be deprived of their rights, which the
legislature has explicitly granted them.
William L. Montague
2

0 Whitley v. Spokane & I. Ry., 23 Idaho 642, 658, 132 Pac. 121, 126 (1913).
212 Harper &James, Torts §24.5 (1956).
22 Bnef for Appellee, p. 6, Harlan Natl Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482 (Ky.
1961).2 3

H ale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950); Bays v. Cox s Adm r,
312 Ky.
827, 229 S.W.2d 737 (1950).
2

4 Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 482, 484 (1961).

